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Abstract. This study examined the conflict in South Sudan, which started in December 
2013 due to political dissatisfaction between President Salva Kiir and his then Vice 
President Riek Machar. When South Sudan got independence in 2011 through a referendum 
where more-than 98 percent of the population supported secession from Sudan, the country 
became a case study for potential secessions in Africa. However, the euphoria of 
independence quickly evaporated, and immediately replaced by violent conflict. Thus, the 
study explored the major causes of the conflict and concluded that political discontent 
resulting from power struggle among the elites fuelled the conflict. Furthermore, the study 
argues that citing ethnicity as the fundamental cause of the conflict is misleading and ill-
conceived. Rather than being the catalyst of the conflict, the present conflict in South Sudan 
has rekindled ethnic identities and ideologies to a record height. The new wave of ethnic 
sentiment in South Sudan is as a result of irrational quest for political power and control 
among the top echelons in the country. Although ethnicity is not considered as the main 
cause of the conflict, however, given that the present situation has invigorated ethnic 
identities and sentiments in the country, the study concludes that any viable solution to the 
conflict must give incentives to fair ethnic and inter-ethnic representation and coalitions.  
Keywords. South Sudan, Power struggle, Ethnicity, Violence conflict, Peace-building. 
JEL. A13, A14, A30. 
 
1. Introduction 
outh Sudan, the youngest country in the world as of today has experienced 
conflict at different stages of its emancipation. South Sudan civil war is 
traceable back to 1955, when Sudan was trapped in a bloody civil conflict 
that led to her independence from a long rule by the Anglo-Egyptian regimes in 
1956 (Ottaway & El-Sadany, 2012). South Sudan being part of Sudan as of then 
was involved in the protracted violent struggle for independence. After gaining 
independence as part of Sudan in 1956, the Southern region of Sudan (now South 
Sudan) faced internal marginalization and suppression from her Northern 
neighbors, which resulted in internal conflict and distrust between the North and 
South. According to Ottaway & El-Sadany (2012) colonial legacy laid the 
foundation for post independence conflict in Sudan, given that the country was 
officially partitioned into two - North and South by the colonial masters. Thus, 
even before gaining independence, the people of Sudan have already developed a 
sense of dissimilarity among themselves.  
In 1983, due to feelings of marginalization, the Southerners, under the 
leadership of John Garang sought independence from the North, which resulted in 
a civil war that lasted until 2005, when the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” 
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(CPA) was signed between the Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM), a 
political front for the Southerners and the ruling Sudanese government in 
Khartoum. The CPA relatively brought peace to the country. However, in 2011, 
South Sudan seceded from Sudan through a referendum, which more-than 98 
percent of the population voted in favor of secession from Sudan. Regrettably, the 
oil rich country was confronted with internal conflict almost from the onset of her 
independence.   
A lot of factors have been identified to be the key issues that prompted the 
conflict, such as political discontent and greed for power among the elites, weak 
institutions, ethnicity and the availability of “lootable” natural resources among 
others. These identified factors in one way or another prompted the conflict or 
plays a role in sustaining it. Worrisomely, the two main actors in the conflict, 
President Salva Kiir and his former vice Riek Machar have manipulated the 
situation, and to some degree managed to convince their ethnic groups that the 
conflict is ethnically motivated, rather than a consequence of a personal and 
political dissatisfaction between the two leaders, while availability of natural 
resources has made it easy for the warring factions to access materials resources 
and thus prolonging the conflict.   
 
2. Methodology  
The study employed the content analysis method. The reason for adopting this 
method is primarily because the study is a qualitative research that relied heavily 
on documentary evidence in data collection. Therefore, the content analysis 
method, using secondary sources of data became imperative. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The study is guided by the theory of Protracted Social Conflict developed by 
Edward Azar in the early 1970s. It generally refers to long lasting, complex, 
severe, commonly enduring, and often violent conflicts. The theory explains 
prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as 
security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions and positions, 
and economic participation (Ramsbotham, 2005). The theory suggests that 
protracted social conflict is almost inevitable in situation where a group’s identity 
is threatened or frustrated or when their access to basic needs is limited. In this 
case, hostile interactions between communal or ethnic groups that are based in 
deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural hatreds, which persist over long 
periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence, are indications of protracted 
social conflict (Azar, 1990).  
In summary, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived 
of satisfaction of their basic needs, when there is a feeling of marginalization in 
power structure on the basis of communal identity, resulting from colonial legacy, 
domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of the society. Azar 
identified four variables, as the predominant sources of protracted social conflict: 
communal content, deprivation of human needs, governance and the state’s role, 
and international linkages (Azar, 1990).  
On the first variable “Communal Content,” Azar contends that “multi-ethnicity” 
is the major cause of protracted social conflict in any given society. Multi-
ethnicity, whether as a result of colonial conquest and legacy or historical 
dominance of one group over other, often create “disarticulation between the state 
and society as a whole” (Azar, 1990: 7; Ramsbotham, Miall, & Woodhouse, 2011). 
Azar notes that, “it is the relationship between identity groups and the state that is 
at the core of the problem.” States that are dominated by a single ethnic group or a 
coalition of a few communal groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other 
groups in the society usually create an avenue for protracted social conflict. In this 
respect, one may argue that South Sudan being a country where a certain ethnic 
group - the Dinka dominates both the political and economic landscape to their 
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advantage provokes a feeling of marginalization and subjugation among other 
ethnicities in the country.   
Besides, protracted social conflict is usually imminent in multi-ethnic settings, 
where the governments and leaders are unable, incapable or unwilling to provide 
basic human necessities to the population. Consequently, individuals turn to their 
social groups/ ethnicity for sustenance. Such disconnection of the society and the 
state creates mistrust and apathy for the government by the citizens. In Africa, 
ethnic segregation is linked to colonial legacy, which, artificially partitioned and 
imposed European ideas of territorial statehood onto a multitude of communal 
groups (Ramsbotham, 2005). This resulted in the domination of certain ethnic 
groups by others. In most cases, the dominant group isolates itself from the needs 
of other groups, leading to an even bigger separation between groups even within 
an ethnicity (Ramsbotham, 2005).  
The second variable “Human Needs”, deals with accessibility to developmental 
human needs. Human needs are insatiable and evolve; the satisfaction of a 
particular need gives rise to another need. The basic needs (food, shelter, clothing, 
sanitation, education, and healthcare) are the basis of all human needs (Macslow, 
1943). Thus, individual or communal survival depends on the provision of their 
basic needs, however, due to structural scarcity; these basic needs are rarely 
attainable to a segment of the society, whilst others live in affluence. Consequently, 
destitution and lack suffered by a segment of the society as against another, paves 
way for grievances resulting from deprivation. When such grievances are not 
properly managed, they often degenerate to protracted social conflict. Therefore, 
the degree to which minority groups can access the market or political institutions 
is a factor that can avert or induce protracted social conflict. Although physical 
needs may not be a direct trigger of conflict, they reinforce the dynamics of 
conflict in societies experiencing severe lack. 
The third variable, “Government and the States Role,” examines the role of the 
state in making sure that all communal groups within its border and jurisdiction are 
well taken care of, in terms of meeting their basic needs, ensuring fair allocation of 
resources and access to political power. Azar contends that a common issue with 
countries experiencing protracted social conflict is that power is dominantly 
controlled by one identity group. Consequently, the available resources are 
recycled among the ruling group at the expense of other groups. Besides, conscious 
efforts are made by the ruling group to hinder other groups from fair access to 
political power. Thus, there is a direct relationship between regime type and the 
level of legitimacy, access to basic needs and protracted social conflict (Azar, 
1990). 
The last variable “International Linkages,” examines how external influence 
affects communal groups’ access to basic needs, security and recognition. Azar 
identified economic dependency and client relationships as two main factors that 
weakens the autonomy of a state and thus, affects its overall functionality. In this 
case, states that depend on others for economic development often experience 
undue external influence that usually distort their domestic political and economic 
systems, with inadvertent adverse impact on communal groups access to basic 
needs in these states. Client relationships, implies where a state entrust its domestic 
security to another state. In such an arrangement, a state guarantees security to 
another in return for loyalty. The obvious impact of such arrangement is that the 
country receiving security guarantee, sacrifices its autonomy and independence, 
which has an impact on how the needs of the communal groups are addressed. 
Furthermore, Azar identified four possible consequences of protracted social 
conflict as: deterioration of physical security; institutional deformity; psychological 
ossification and increased dependency and cliency. Observably, all the 
aforementioned are evident in the present state of South Sudan. Thus, the theory 
provides a clear background that explains the persistent conflict in the country.  
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4. Factors facilitating the conflict 
This section discusses three factors that contribute to the conflict, which 
include: power struggle, ethnicity, natural resources and corruption. 
  
4.1. Power struggle  
The struggle for political power between President Salva Kiir and his former 
vice, Riek Machar is at the root of the violent conflict that began in December 
2013. The death of John Garang, the leader of SPLM in 1983, paved way for the 
ascension of Salva Kiir as the leader of SPLM, who then led South Sudan to 
achieve independence in 2011. After gaining independence, Salva Kiir became the 
president, while Riek Machar became his vice. As Kiir took over the affairs of the 
world’s newest country, a number of his cabinet members and senior SPLM 
members, including Machar and the SPLM’s secretary-general, Pagan Amum, 
viewed his leadership as reckless and autocratic (Koos & Gutschke, 2014). The 
tension among the political class gathered momentum, when the vice-president 
Riek Machar, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun, and Madam Rebecca 
Garang, the widow of the late SPLM leader John Garang, publicly announced their 
intentions to run for the post of Chair of the SPLM, and by implication President of 
the country. President Kiir responded, by revoking executive powers of the vice-
president in April 2013 (Dessalegn, 2017). Then in July of the same year, he 
dissolved the government, removing Machar from the position of vice-president of 
the nation and other cabinet members from their positions (International Crisis 
Group, 2014). 
On 16 December 2013, President Kiir accused his former vice Riek Machar of 
plotting a coup against his government, which Machar denied. Consequently, 
President Kiir ordered the arrest of dissident politicians including Pagan Amum. 
Machar managed to elude arrest and fled Juba to his home in Jonglei State. Within 
this period, targeted ethnic killings of civilians took place in Juba, providing an 
ethnic dimension to the political power struggle between Kiir and Machar. Weeks 
after the clashes erupted in Juba, heavy fighting between army units loyal to the 
government and rebel forces loyal to Machar spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity, 
Central Equatoria and Upper Nile. Thus, the situation escalated from a political rift 
between President Kiir and Machar to a full blown civil war. 
In December 2013, rebels affiliated to Machar held the oil rich towns of Bentiu, 
and Malakal. The strategically and economically importance of the two towns drew 
the attention and involvement of external governments in the conflict. The 
government of Uganda, though under the claim of protecting its borders, 
intervened in the conflict and used Ariel bombardment to push the rebels out and 
help government forces to reclaim Bentiu, and Malakal. Thus, the conflict 
gradually progressed from a political rift among Kiir and Machar, to a violent 
internal conflict and to a potential regional conflict with the involvement of 
Uganda. 
 
4.2. Ethnicity 
Ethnicity has been the simplistic explanation of the conflict in South Sudan. The 
elites such as Kiir and Machar has manipulated their political interest and 
differences and present them in favor of ethnic nationalism, mobilizing their 
kinsmen into participating in a violent conflict that has taken thousands of lives and 
render millions of South Sudanese homeless, whilst others are turned to refugees in 
neighboring countries. Surely, the mass killings of the Nuer people by the Dinka 
paramilitary groups in Juba in the aftermath of the dispute between President Kiir 
and his former vice Machar in late 2013 were the pretext to the origin of the 
outbreak of the war, which at first was only a political dispute. Since then, Kiir and 
Machar have successfully mobilized key groups of their respective communities, 
thus, making ethnicity the easiest and simplest explanation of the conflict and the 
atrocities committed against civilians by the warring factions. 
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 The claim that ethnicity is the root cause of the conflict is prejudiced, given the 
fact that not all the Dinka’s are in support of Kiir and same is applicable to Machar 
among his Nuer ethnic group. For example, the Jieng Council of Elders at some 
point accused Kiir of promoting ethnic divide among the Dinka clans. However, 
one cannot isolate ethnicity from the conflict given that the official version is that 
the conflict was triggered by an attempted coup, of which the alleged coup-
conspirators came from a range of South Sudan’s ethnic groups headed by the Nuer 
targeting the removal of President Kirr who is a Dinka. Despite the weight of the 
above argument, available evidence shows that there are Nuer civil servants and 
soldiers who have remained loyal to President Kirr’s government and Riek 
Machar’s followers are not entirely Nuer. In some instances, Nuer opposition 
forces have also killed other Nuer people because of their perceived political 
affiliation. This is not to deny the fact that in many cases, individuals have been 
targeted primarily because of their ethnic affiliation.  
 Amnesty International documented instances where civilians have been 
targeted by different parties to the conflict, based primarily on their ethnicity, 
which could be a justification that ethnicity plays a roles in the conflict. Our 
position is that rather than ethnicity being the catalyst of the conflict, the present 
conflict in South Sudan has rekindled and inflamed ethnic identities and hatred 
among tribal groups to a record height, particularly amongst the two numerically 
big tribes, the Nuer and the Dinka. Thus, the resounding wave of tribal bigotry is a 
bye product of the conflict. In light of the above, and given the heightened ethnic 
sentiments in the country, South Sudan should pusue an electoral system that gives 
incentives to ethnic and inter-ethnic representation as a way to mollify the warring 
factions. Accordingly, the different ethnic groups - not only the Dinka and the Nuer 
should be fairly assimilated into leadership/governance positions as a way to pacify 
the feelings of marginalization, neglect and apathy, particularly among the minority 
ethnic groups.  
 
4.3. Natural resources and corruption 
Natural resources have become a course to many African countries, in the sense 
that it has resulted in high level of corruption among government officials and in 
most cases encourage the government to disconnect itself from the citizens, as they 
rely on oil revenue instead of tax from citizens. This situation applies by and large 
to South Sudan, where oil revenue constitutes 98 percent of the national budget and 
practically all foreign currency earning (Wel, 2013). Thus, South Sudan has the 
most oil-dependent budget in the world. Obviously, governments that do not 
depend on their citizens’ taxes seem not to be very much concerned about their 
welfare. This assumption rings true of the situation in South Sudan. The 
government has largely failed to improve the welfare and living conditions of the 
population. Instead, the government appears to be much more concerned with 
internal competitions about rent-seeking and access to natural resources and power. 
In addition, the government is marred with rotating a set of elites who move 
seamlessly between the frontlines of rebellion and positions in government, as 
political situations change (De Waal, 2014).  
In South Sudan, political power is leveraged to secure wealth and apparently 
there is a high level of corruption among state officials. When President Kiir 
reshuffled his entire cabinet in July 2013, removing prominent elites, such as 
former vice-president Rick Machar and other cabinet Ministers, he accused the 
affected government officials of corruption (Lunn, 2016). Besides, in 2012 
President Salva Kiir accused 75 ministers and officials of having stolen four billion 
dollars (USD 4,000,000,000) in state funds and demanded that the stolen money be 
returned. According to Aljazeera, only 1.5 percent of this sum was actually 
recovered (Aljazeera, 2014). 
Given the above scenario, one may argue that the conflict in the country is 
actually a function of anger and frustration experienced by the majority of the 
population. Frustrated soldiers, particularly junior officers and impoverished 
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youths now see hope in joining militia groups and take up arms against every 
imaginable enemy, including the government and even themselves. Due to high 
level of poverty and hopelessness, some youths now believe that it is more 
honorable to die in the battlefield, than to die gradually from imposed hunger and 
destitution. Accepted that poverty, anger, frustration and hopelessness may not be 
the immediate driver of the violent conflict in South Sudan, however they play a 
role in sustaining the conflict. The point here is that the afore-stated factors have 
made recruitment of fighters undemanding for the conflicting parties. Thus, any 
framework for peace and stability in South Sudan must incorporate a 
comprehensive and genuine road map for youth empowerment/ emancipation 
programs. 
 
5. Cease-fires and peace agreements  
Since the beginning of the conflict in South Sudan, several cease-fires and 
peace agreements have been initiated. When fighting started in December 2013, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional association 
comprising of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan 
and Uganda, initiated a peace plan and mandated three envoys to broker a peace 
deal between Kiir and Machar. IGAD envoys got the warring parties to sign a 
cease-fire agreement on 23 January 2014. However the agreement was violated 
shortly after it came into force. 
On 9 May 2014, President Kiir and former vice-president Machar signed 
another ceasefire agreement in Addis Ababa. The agreement was a temporal 
ceasefire, providing humanitarian corridor up to 30 days, while a framework for a 
permanent ceasefire was being worked on; unfortunately the agreement was 
violated within 24 hours. In August 2015, a peace deal known as the “Compromise 
Peace Agreement” brokered by IGAD was signed by the conflicting parties, but the 
agreement collapsed in July 2016 and failed to quell the conflict. In December 
2017, another ceasefire agreement was signed by the government and several 
armed groups during peace negotiations in Addis Ababa. The agreement was to 
take effect from 24 December 2017 and requested all warring factions to 
“immediately freeze in their locations”; as well it mandated them to release 
political detainees in their custody. Like earlier agreements, the ceasefire was 
violated and analysts believe that it failed because not all the warring factions were 
party to the agreement.   
Then on 27 June 2018, President Salva Kiir and former vice-president Riek 
Machar, signed a “permanent ceasefire agreement” in Khartoum, in the presence of 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. The 
agreement was intended to bring an end to the 5 years civil war. Unlike earlier 
agreements, this particular agreement allows the African Union and IGAD to 
“deploy the necessary forces to supervise the agreed permanent ceasefire” (Mbah, 
2018). One of the central and contentious issues in the agreement was the proposal 
to have three different capitals for South Sudan as way to distribute power. 
Subsequent negotiations were scheduled to be held in Nairobi, Kenya and Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia respectively. Although the above agreement did not ensure a 
complete ceasefire, however the subsequent negotiations went on and on 12 
September 2018, President Salva Kiir signed another round of peace agreement 
with rebel factions in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa to end the civil war 
(Maasho, 2018). Weather this latest agreement will facilitate sustainable peace in 
South Sudan, is the question in every ones mouth. However, the answer will be 
determined with time.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The actualization of the sovereign state of South Sudan placed enormous 
responsibilities on the government of the world’s newest state. The government 
was confronted with numerous challenges, such as border demarcation with Sudan, 
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ending post independence conflict, building functional democratic institutions and 
transforming the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) into a national army 
among other issues. Unfortunately, instead of moving towards nation-building, the 
country drifted into a deadly conflict. Despite efforts by international actors such as 
IGAD and UNMISS to resolve the conflict, the violence continues to rage because 
the interrelated casual factors and by extension the root causes of the conflict - 
power struggle, patronage and impunity and weak institutional capacity among 
others are yet to be properly addressed.  
As it is, the conflict requires a sincere political solution devoid of rapacity. In 
this case, applying the “moral imagination to peace” (Lederach, 2005), will be a 
genuine step towards realizing peace in South Sudan. According to Lederach, when 
engulfed in violence, achieving peace requires connecting the past, present and 
future (Ogbonna, 2017). In this case, peace needs to be imagined, while still 
remaining grounded in the realities of the conflict. Apparently, conflict 
transformation defies a specific set of techniques; rather, it requires a multi-layer 
analysis that includes the actors understanding and perception of the conflict 
situation, as well as all the other elements and aspects, dynamics and dimensions of 
the conflict. 
In the specific case of South Sudan, the warring factions should evaluate the 
fundamental goal of the independence struggle in comparison with the present state 
of the country. Thus, the casual factors that led to the conflict, mainly power 
sharing and control along the invigorated ethnic identities should be made the 
bedrock of any peace-building process and effort. 
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